Glenn

THE OHIO VALLEY-GREAT LAKES ETHNOHISTORY ARCHIVES: THE MIAMI COLLECTION
It is noted that the following work from the Miami Archives should be read and considered within the historical context in which it was composed and printed. The opinions expressed and the language used do not reflect the opinions or standards of the Glenn A. Black Laboratory of Archaeology, but are, rather, indicative of thought in that historical moment during which the document was published.


 

Lewis Evans: A Letter
With an Answer

(December 1, 1755)

(Due to length divided here into three parts)


In: Gipson, Lawrence Henry, Lewis
Evans,
Philadelphia: The Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, 1939,
pp. 177-212+.

pp. 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186.


(page 181)

AN

A N S W E R

To so much of the foregoing LETTER, as
concerns the Public,
&c.

A Paper published in last Monday's New-York Mercury, being in a particular Manner directed to me, I am obliged, in Justice to my own Character, and for the Satisfaction of the Publick, to give Answer to so much thereof, as relates to four Points.

1. WHETHER the Virginia Solicitations for the Landing of the European Troops in that Colony, in Order from thence to make a Descent upon Fort DU QUESNE be not to the last Degree absurd; which the Author asserts, upon the Authority of my Map, is true in itself, and agreeable to any Intimation of mine; or not.

2. WHETHER the Preservation of Oswego was owing to General SHIRLEY'S Proceeding thither, as the Letter Writer asserts, is true or not.

3. WHETHER Frontenac is of the Importance that the Author represents it, or not.

4. WHETHER a Passage in the Analysis of my General Map, which runs thus: "The French being in Possession of Fort Frontenac at the Peace of Ryswick, which they attained during their War with the Confederates, gives them an undoubted Title to the Acquisition of the North-West Side of St. Laurence River, from thence to their Settlement at Montreal1," is true, as I thought it was, or false, as this Author asserts.

I must premise an Apology, that as this Letter was published, when the Author knew I was in New-York, and of Course, must be destitute of the Papers and Books, necessary to carry on a Con- (page 182) troversy so deeply founded as the latter Article, and the sudden Departure of a Ship now going to England, to carry the Charges against me, not admitting me Time enough, to go or send for them to Philadelphia: He thought it advisable thus to nonplus me, for the Sake of damning my Credit, and imposing on People in England by these egregious Misrepresentations. But tho' I have not been able to borrow here any one public Paper, necessary in the Dispute, but the Articles of the Peace of Ryswicke; I hope however, my Familiarity with the Affairs of America, and a few Notes I had casually by me, will be sufficient to set the Affair in a clear Light. And the Reader is desired to observe, that his Paper is only thrown out occasionally; and that the various Rights and Pretensions of the English and French to all this Country will be ready for the Press in a few Months. But as it would not be proper to intermix with what so immediately concerns the Public, any Replies to the personal Insults that the Author, from his superior Station, throws down upon me, which are worthy only of Ridecule, I shall not so far gratify him, as to make him the Reply he deserves, lest he have the Excuse he wants of having Parties form'd against him to impede his Designs; and he is with so much Industry endeavouring to make. And as every Reader would not be otherwise sensible of the Necessity I am under, of this Publication, at this Time, I have prefixt the Paper which is the Cause of it- and were I to inform him, by whom it is ushered to the Public, he would imagine he would have had Something else to do.

 

 

C H A P. I.

An Enquiry into the Propriety of sending British Forces to Virginia; The Consequences that have followed the Ordering those to Albany, that had been sent thither; and will follow, if not supplied.

 

 

 

The Letter Writer represents the Absurdity of sending Forces to Virginia.

 

THE Author of the Letter begins with saying, "That Evans's Map of the Middle British Colonies shews in a very striking Point of Light, that the Virginia Solicitations for the Landing of the European Troops in that Colony, in order from thence to make a Descent upon Fort Du Quesne, were to the last Degree absurd.

Which wants no Refutation.

 

"Let any Person look at the Map and he will perceive that this wants no Refutation; because of the Nearness of that Fort to the Sea by (page 183) that Way, and the vast Distance it is by any other; and none destitute of Woods, Defiles and Indian Enemies. But let him look into the Analysis2, and he will find,

 

that there is but about seventy Miles Land Carriage, between Potomack and the Branches of Ohio. This Land Carriage begins at a Place, 'till of late, pretty well settled by the English. Potomack, in all the Way from the Falls to Wills Creek, Spring and Fall, when the Water is high, or to the South Branch in dry Seasons, at the Head of Inland Navigation, has not in all the Way so many bad Rifts as the Mohock's River has, from Skenectady to Fort Hunter. This Part we are yet in Possession of;

 

By Virginia is the only near Passage to Ohio.

The Portage about 70 Miles.

and were, after Braddock's Defeat, and the Junction of the routed Party, with the Reserve under Col. Dunbar, of the Carrying Place to the Waters of Ohio; being but 12 or 14 Miles to the Mouth of Redstone Creek, from whence to Fort du Quesne, the fine River Monaungahela is 6 or 700 Feet wide, every where gentle and deep enough for Flats, which would carry any four Batteaux that can go on the Mohocks River with all their Loading.

 

which we were once Masters of.

THE Army sent by his Majesty to Virginia, after the Defeat of one Part of them, and the Destruction of the Artillery, Stores and Provisions, and the Death of General Braddock, fell under the Command of Colonel Dunbar. It was thought adviseable to retire to the Settlements, to recover of the Confusion they were in, and to repair some of their Cloathing. As his Excellency Mr. William Shirley was the only remaining General Officer, the Colonel, as soon as the Command devolved upon him, consulted him by Letter, What to do?

 

Virginia Forces under Col. Dunbar.

The General's Answer reached the Army near Conegej, before they had yet arrived in Pensilvania, in the Way to Philadelphia, Ordering them to repair to Albany. The honorable Mr. Dinwiddie, Governor of Virginia, having also wrote to the General, and representing the distracted State his Colony would be reduced to, if the Troops should leave it, the General wrote a second Letter to Col. Dunbar; ordering him to return, and make a new Attempt on Fort du Quesne, if it was judge practicable, otherwise to observe his former Order. This was received and a Council of War called thereon, before they reached Shippensburg- and an Attempt on Fort du Quesne was judged impracticable, for Want of Artillery and Ammunition;

 

Ordered to Albany by G. Shirley.
Second Orders impracticable.

They proceeded in Pursuance of the former Order, and arrived at Philadelphia the 29th of August.

 

Arrived in Philadelphia.

AT the latter End of September Col. Dunbar received the General's Orders to proceed to Albany, where Winter Quarters should be provided for the Forces under his Command. This was three

 

G. Shirley's third Orders.

 

The State of Albany,

 

(page 184) Weeks after General Johnson had defeated the French at Lake St. Sacrament, and after the Eastern Colonies had poured out their People by thousands to his Assistance, and ALL the Frontiers, on that Side, were in perfect Safety.

and of Virginia when the Forces left Philadelphia.

 

It was also about a Month after ALL the Frontiers of Virginia had been reduced to one universal Waste by the Burning, Murdering and Scalping committed by the Indians. In Virginia the Enemy was fetched to the Door and left there, without any body to oppose him; there no Forces were left to cover the Militia, while they formed themselves into an Army for their own Defence.

The Forces at Albany very much _____ (illeg. copy)

 

October 1. Col. Dunbar with his Forces set out from Philadelphia, and the 14th reached Albany, where they found, that no Directions had been given for either Quarters, Barracks or Fuel. Six Weeks were they obliged to lie incamped in the Rain and Snow, 'till Barracks were built them. And they were entirely obliged to his Excellency Sir CHARLES HARDY, that they got a Stick of Wood to burn. So were our Forces disposed of.

 

 

 

Laurel Hill and the Portage between Ohio and Potomack given the French.

 

By thus ordering the Forces to Albany, the important Pass of Laurel Hill, and the Command of the Carrying Place to the Rivers on this Side, were given to the French; instead of preserving to ourselves the Passage to Ohio down easy Streams, by a Choice of two fine Rivers; when there was not a Man living, who doubted our being able to have secured both with Ease.

The bad Consequences which have followed the drawing away the British Forces from Virginia.

 

Let me now enumerate the Consequences that have followed the Drawing away from Virginia the Forces his Majesty had sent for its Protection, and the Recovery of the Lands our Enemies had usurped there. In the first Place; the French, as they had now Nothing to fear on that Side, sent all the Forces they could so easily spare at Du Quesne, Wenango and Presqu'Isle,

Niagra better ______ (illeg. copy) to the Enemy.

 

to improve and defend the Works at Niagra; which must have made that Post difficult to take, had our Forces on Lake Ontario been ready Time enough, and sufficiently provided to attack it.

The Welinis lost.

 

2dly, Whatever Hopes the Welnis, a League of Six powerful Nations3, who till then remained Masters of the lower Parts of Ohio, and were firmly attached to us, and in open War with the French, and obstructed their Passage that Way to Du Quesne, them under a Necessity of submitting to the French; as our abandoning the Frontiers of Virginia, must have put they were at their Mercy, destitute of Arms, destitute of Ammunition, and past

 

(page 185) a Possibility of obtaining either. 3dly, The Shawanese, till then on Terms of Civility with us, and the Delawares, always attached to our Interest, and lately united with the Wiandots, on seeing themselves at the Mercy of the French, in their Habitations on Ohio, and connected with several of the Indians bordering on our Settlements, and some in the Heart of them, have all deserted our Interest, which they had not Strength to help,

 

The Shawanese, Delawares, and Junandats go over to the French.

and now commit the most shocking Massacres, and Waste on our Frontiers, all the Way from Carolina to New-York, to prove their Attachment to the French their new Allies. By this it appears, that ALL the Indians from Albany, South-Westerly to Missisippi, are lost by this Act, in 4 or 5 Months Time.

 

And now ravage our Frontiers from Carolina to New-York.

And this Author would fain prevent our Recovering them by a new Attempt on that Side; and is making a Point of Frontenac, as if that were the sole Key to Ohio. To complete our Ruin on that Side, which is inevitable without Assistance from England, we have but the Cherokees and Chicasaws to lose. The former are now upon a Design of going to Ohio, which if they effect, their Loss is past Recovery. Let the Inclinations of the Chicasaws be afterwards ever so firm to our Nation, Necessity must then compel them to support themselves by the good Fortune of the French. If that happen, which Nothing can prevent, but Assistance on the Virginia Side from England, Frontenac, whether in the Hands of the French or the English, will be of no more Consequence than if it were under Water. To explain this to the Reader.

 

The Letter Writers Proposal is to prevent the Recovery of the Indians already lost; and to give up the Cherokees and Chicasaws yet remaining.

 

 

 

THE immense Value of the Country on the Ohio and its Branches has been explained in the Analysis4. The French hitherto, for going to that Country, have made pretty equal Use of the Missisippi, whose Mouth they are entire Masters of, and of St. Laurence, whose Navigation is commonly obstructed with Ice five or six Months in the Year. Adjacent to the Entrance of St. Laurence, the English are possest of Newfoundland and Nova-Scotia, both furnished with excellent Harbours, and the latter with a good Fortress at Halifax, where our Men of War, may rendevouz, refit, refresh and dispose of their Prizes, in the Neighbourhood of flourishing Colonies, where they can be plentifully furnished with Provisions and naval Stores, and in such a Latitude, that the Worm can not do the Ships, in or out of Harbour, any Damage. And by that Means, while our Nation remains Master at Sea, we can pretty well prevent any numerous Supplies coming that Way to America. Three capital Nations, consisting each of many Tribes, have been hitherto the only Impedi- (page 186) ment to the French's making the Gulph of Mexico the sole Passage to Ohio.

 

The French hitherto have pretty equally used Missisippi and St. Laurence to go to Ohio.
St. Laurence obstructed with Ice: And it's Entrance exposed to the English Shipping.

 

3 Indian Nations formerly prevented the French.
1 The Welinis subdued.
2 The Cherokees wavering.
3 The Chicasaws can not stand long unsupported.

 

TheWelinis, as already mentioned, have before now their Destiny determined. The Cherokees are fluctuating; but how the Chicosaw s stand, I have not heard lately; if they waver, they are gone for ever. Unpolished as our Indians are, they must know their Interest lies in siding with the Strongest; and that it is best coming about while it is yet fair Weather. If they see we have no Forces to the Southward, to support them in our Friendship, that will not be long first; for they have neither Arms, Cloathing, or Ammunition, but from the Europeans, and cannot do without them; and if we cannot supply them, they must have Recourse to the French, even supposing no Violence were used. If these are lost, there will be so easy, tho' long a Passage to Ohio, without one Land-Carriage by the Way, and at all Seasons of the Year, that that by St. Laurence will be for ever abandoned. It can not be above two Years before that is brought about, if the Southern Colonies continue thus exposed.

The Militia can not be raised in the Southern Colonies; and why.

 

IT may perhaps be represented, that the Militia there may go against the Enemy, as they do in the Northern Colonies. The Thing is impossible; they have for the far greater Part scarce Whites enough to prevent the Defection of their Slaves; and if any considerable Party should happen to be defeated, when abroad, it would be scarce possible to prevent their total Revolt. The dangerous Consequences of the French's being suffered to remain on Ohio, to the British Interest; the Necessity of securing the Country back of Carolina in Time, and some of our Mistakes in Indian Affairs, have been pointed out in the Analysis5, to which I beg Leave to refer the Reader.

Supplies to Missisippi and Moville not to be prevented by our Fleets.

 

Some may perhaps imagine, that let the inland Parts of Florida, be ever so free to the French, we have it still in our Power, with our superior Fleets to prevent their's coming to Moville or New-Orleans from France, with Supplies of Men, Arms or Provisions.

Provisions they have enough. Arms and Ammunition they use little.

 

As for Provisions, they stand in Need of none; the Settlements on Ohio and its Branches, Junundat and Detroit are now so many Plantations, and not Garrisons of Soldiers, and capable with Ease of supplying them. As we put them to no Use of Arms, or Destruction of Ammunition, what they have already, will last them a long while.

The Reason why the British Fleets can not Cruize in the Gulph of Mexico.

 

But this signifies little. It is impossible for our Fleet, were we to fit out the Utmost our Nation is capable of, to secure the Gulph of Mexico at all. There is not a Road, Harbou or Town that can give us any Relief of Provisoins or naval Stores, or in the least shelter us in a Storm, or furnish a healthy Landing to refresh the Men and clean the Ships. Our being destitute of these, no Ships after a

___________________________________

1 (, p. 181) p. 14.

2 (, p. 183) p. 23 & 24.

3 (†, p. 184) The Welinis called by the French Ilinois, consist of the Tawightwis, Miniamis, Piancashews, Wawiaghtas, Piques and Xi8ka8cs (?).

4 (‡, p. 185) p. 31.

5 (*, p. 186) p. 15.



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