THE OHIO VALLEY-GREAT LAKES ETHNOHISTORY
ARCHIVES: THE MIAMI COLLECTION
It is noted that the following work from the Miami Archives should be read and considered within the historical context in which it was composed and printed. The opinions expressed and the language used do not reflect the opinions or standards of the Glenn A. Black Laboratory of Archaeology, but are, rather, indicative of thought in that historical moment during which the document was published.
(Nov. 30, 1764 - Feb. 26, 1765)
(Due to length divided here into two parts)
Bouquet, Henry and Gage, Thomas in:
Michigan Pioneer and Historical
Society Historical Collections,
Vol. 19, pp. 283-295.
contrary to this order, attempt to carry Liquors Dry Goods or Merchandize in a clandestine manner: the Cargoes of such Delinquents are to be seized and lodged in the Kings Stores till orders can be had thereupon from the General & it is particularly forbid to any Persons at Fort Pitt to have any Dealing whatever with the Indians & to sell or give them any Ammunition Liquors or Dry Goods without orders from the commanding officer at that Post, who will give such orders in cases only where His Majestys Service shall absolutely require it.
All kinds of eatables & the Stores necessary for the use of the officers & soldiers of His Majestys Troops in Garrison at those Posts are permitted to pass provided the Carriers produce to the officers commanding at such Post Permits signed by the Genl. The officers commanding in this Department or the officers commanding at Fort Pitt. This order to be made Publick at each Post for the Information of all Persons whom it may concern.
Given under my hand at Head Quarters in Fort Pitt this 29th day of November 1764.
Colonel Bouquet's orders in the Southern District 29th November 1764. [entered.]
[A 8, p 485]
COL. HENRY BOUQUET TO GEN. THOMAS GAGE
30th November 1764
The Army returned the 28th Instant to this Post, where I have found your Excellency's Letters of the 1st October, 9th & 11th of Nov. The Royal Americans proceeded down the communication all ye Voluntiers have followed this day wt ye first Battalion of the Pennl Regiment and the second will march to morrow likewise for Carlisle.
Fort Pitt is garrisoned by Five Companies of the 42nd Regt. under the command of Capt. William Murray. Fort Ligonier, has a company of the same corps, under the command Captain Stewart, Fort Bedford another Company commanded by Capt. William Grant. Fort Cumberland, half a company commanded by Lieut James Eddington.
All the Captives of which I inclose the List, are sent to the provinces they were taken form.
The Cocknewaga Indians under Capt Artells Command, are to proceed to morrow, with the Deputies of the Delawares, and Shawanese, to Sir William Johnson, The Six Hostages of the Delawares are at this Post, as to the Shawanese, we have been obliged to leave two of (page 284) theirs sick upon the road. I have sent another, with a Delaware to the Ouabache & the Miamis, to acquaint of those nations of the Peace, and I have allowed three to go as Deputies to Sir Williams chusing rather to seize the favourable opportunity of sending them with the Cocknewaga, and giving thereby the facility to Sir William of concluding Peace with these two Nations at the same time, than to give the Trouble of a separate Treaty by waiting for their Deputies who are to come wt the Captives, as the Red Hawk one of the Hostages was equally to the Chief of the Deputation.
Besides that this Nation is so fickle and wavering that there is no Dependence upon their Promises, till they are fulfilled. I have therefore for the present no Hostages of that Nation to leave here, but they have engaged to send four immediately.
For the Mingoes, they have behaved as usual after stealing upon the march seven or eight of our best Horses, they run off; that Vermin is not worth treating with them; we shall however have two Hostages of those Banditti when their Chief returns from the Lakes where I have sent him to give an account of the Peace. he is the only good man among them, but has little sway, I shall not have the Honor to answer your letters of the 9th & 11th Inst. which are come too late to execute the plan you proposed, had I been informed sooner of your Intentions I would have sent an officer with some Shawanese & Delawares (tho it is rather too soon yet to trust them) to the different nations you mention; But if you permit me Sir, I shall take the Liberty to observe from my superficial knowledge of the Savages, that it is not probable such a method would have produced the desired effect. Those distant Tribes would dispise & perhaps insult a Messenger & put us under the disagreeable alternative of suffering tamely the affront or ingaging in a War with them to obtain a precarious satisfaction, Those Nations being extremely indisposed against us, owing to the perfidious Insinuations of French Emissaries and the contemptible light in which they represent us; They would not believe our offers sincere, nor think us able to enforce them. The dread of English Power is in my opinion the sole motive capable of making a solid impression in their minds, & they must be convinced by their own eyes, that it is not out of necessity but out of Regard to them, that we offer our Alliance; and I doubt whether we shall ever root out the French Interest in that Country, till we make our appearance in it with a force sufficient to make ourselves respectable, and awe both the French & the Savages. The notion of our Power well impressed, will facilitate ever after any negotiation with them; and we might then (page 285) with safety reduce our garrisons and send them Messages, and even Orders by a single Messenger, but not before.
I dont expect that the Regiment ordered up the Mississippi will succeed, while there is a nation to oppose them owing to the facility and safety they will find to fire at them every day with Impunity. But if instead of the slow Progress of Ten Miles a day against a rapid stream, exposed all the Time to the embushes of those active Enemies; we had to go down the River at the rate of Fifty miles per day; They would hardly venture to attempt an Opposition, as none of their Parties would see the Batteaux twice and this might be effected from this Post, if two Regiments at least, with a Corps of Rangers and Savages were employed at once in that Expedition; and to prevent the Enemy getting Intellgence of its real destination; it would be easy to give out, that it is intended to rebuild Le Boeuf & Presqu'Isle, and even navigate a day or two up the River, letting only the Commanding officer in the secret.
That embarcation would reach the Mississippi before it would be possible for any Runner to carry the news; the distance from thence to Fort Chartres might be marched or gone by water sooner than the Enemy surprised could collect a sufficient Body to resist, and that Fort once in our possession with such a Force it would be the proper time to offer our Friendship and Trade to the natives, who could not longer impute it to fear or necessity. Time, address and good usage must effect the rest, by attaching them to us, & by degrees breaking off their connections with the French, whose Illicit Trade, and Intrigues might then be more easily suppressed.
Tho I think that such an expedition could hardly fail of success, I am sensible of the difficulties attending it;
First we are commonly too late with our Enterprises, owing to several visible causes, but particularly to the Inconveniency of having to wait orders from home, and the necessity of depending (for want of other Troops upon Provincials who are never ready in Time. Next we appear little disposed to launch into new Paths, untrod before, and finally views of Occonomy so necessary after this dispendious war, make us averse to new Expenses, which however are often increased by running into the other extreme; without mentioning the two first Campaigns in this Country, lost for want of an adequate force and some other Instances, we have evidently brought upon us this Indian war, by being to saving of a few Presents to the Savages, which properly distributed would certainly have prevented it. The same Principle seems to lead the Colonies, who have consumed themselves (page 286) in a feeble and useless defensive, while one half of the money they have spent, might have fitted out an Expedition, that would have cut the Evil by the Root. The Building of Batteaus at Fort Pitt is very dear. The expense of Carriage for stores & Provisions still greater. The Troops so scattered that it is hardly possible to bring in time two Regiments together. And the Ohio being only navigable in the Spring, and a short time in the Summer, the Season for that navigation is past before we can be ready. I do not therefore imagine that the least attention can be paid for the present to this plan, & in taking the Liberty to mention it, I have no other view than to express my good wishes for the success of every Enterprise taken in hand by the Government and that I think it would be a reflection upon the dignity of the nation to defer any longer thro inability to take possession of a Country & Forts ceded to us. While I am upon this subject I must not omit to inform you that the Shawanese & Delawares who went to the Miamis were sent about the middle of September, and consequently long after they had obtained Peace at Presqu'Isle, but by what our Deputys say, it was not done by their whole nations but only by some of them more attached to the French, who have constantly been inciting them to continue the war, and promised to supply them with Ammunition. It is not easy to prove this upon the French Commanding officers, upon the Report of Savages, but it does not appear to me in the least doubtfull, that they at least connaive at it. While they keep Possession of Louisiana, we must expect constant Bevils and endless expenses; and that they will check the Increase of our Colonies, by the frequent inroads of their Savages unless we maintain a considerable force upon the Mississippi; but this is not my business and I return to it. We have received a less Quantity of Provisions in this Department than I required at first, having countermanded Part of it on account of the delays occasioned by the Pennsylvanian Troops. The Troops have wanted for nothing, and you will observe by the returns that the Garrison are all properly supplied. I did not think it advisable to throw more Provisions in my Forts, at this time, as the prospects of a Peace, will soon Lower the Prices of Carriages; Therefore I have no application to make to any Contractors for the present. I had the Honor to acquaint you before the Campaign that the Expedition would be unavoidably attended with a considerable Expence, and on that account Requested, you would appoint a Publick officer to regulate it. You desired that in order to prevent long & intricate Accompts every Person employed, should be paid as soon as service was performed, and the Assurance I gave to the People of it, has made them very active, and they have served as well; but Capt. Barnsley (page 287) writes me of the 20th Novr that he has not received the fifth part of the money necessary to defray the charges of Carriages & c & that he was obliged to stop Payment. I make no doubt that you will please to give your orders thereon, and if necessary send Col. Robertson to close and discharge those Accompts or I shall have the whole Country upon my back.
To save as much expense as possible to the Crown, I have recommenced in the strongest manner to Governor Fanquier to use his influence with the House of Burgesses to engage them to pay the Voluntiers of Virginia,1 who have Joined the Expeditions, and have for the greatest number quitted on that Account their pay as Militia on the Frontiers. As they have not been replaced that I know, it would be no additional expence to the Colony, and they will allow that they have been as usefully employed for them, If you thought fit to enforce my request by a letter to the Governor, it would have a proper weight.
I have likewise recommended those of Maryland to Governor Sharpe, and sent to both the Muster Rolls to prevent any abuse.
I wrote to General Stanwix that I would look out for a Deputy for his Friend Mr. Jackson, our Chaplain:
His Majesty's Resolution to let no Officer sell his commission2 who did not purchase it, will fall heavy upon Col. Haldiman3 & me who can neither purchase, sell or even exchange for the half Pay out of the Royal Americans; and the two Lt. Colonels have declined coming in upon full Pay Excluded from all favours and Pereferrment, even Hope, The Soul of a Soldier is taken from us;
Tho the Act of Parliament1 concerning the Foreigners admitted in His Majesty's service, has left our Career open in America; Coll. Haldimand has seen himself relieved in the Government of Troix Rivieres without the least allowance for the Expence he must have been at; I will not Trouble your Excellency further upon this disagreeable subject, But bet the favour you would give leave to Col. Haldiman to come this winter to New York or Philadelphia, and permit me to go to England next Spring.
[A 7, p 96]
1 See appendix.
2 No officer shall sell his commission, Cf. supra, p. 292.
3 See sketch supra, p. 296.
Return to TOC, p. 17
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